By Meredith Fowlie, Christopher R. Knittel, and Catherine Wolfram * For political and practical reasons, environmental regulations sometimes treat point-source polluters, such as power plants, differently from mobile-source polluters, such as vehicles. This paper measures the extent of this regulatory asymmetry in the case of nitrogen oxides (NOx), the most recalcitrant criteria air pollutant in the United States. We find significant differences in marginal abatement costs across source types: the marginal cost of reducing NOx from cars is less than half the marginal cost of reducing NOx from power plants. Our results measure the possible efficiency gains and distributional implications associated with increasing the sectoral scope of environmental regulations. JEL: Keywords:
A basic tenet in microeconomics holds that, if production has been efficiently allocated, marginal costs should be equalized across producers. Past empirical work has demonstrated that this equivalence does not always hold in practice. Olley and A. Pakes 1996) , failure to equate marginal costs across producers has resulted in substantial efficiency losses.
In the context of environmental regulation, the same principle should apply. The "goods" produced are improvements in environmental quality. In the specific case of emissions regulation, the "producers" are pollution sources capable of reducing their emissions. The equivalence of marginal emissions abatement costs across sources is a necessary condition for cost-effective emissions reduction, provided that marginal damages do not vary significantly across sources. The extent to which this efficiency condition will be satisfied depends significantly on how policymakers design and implement environmental regulations.
Many pollutants are emitted by multiple sources in multiple sectors of the economy. For instance, any high temperature combustion process emits nitrogen oxides (NOx), so planes, trains, ships, trucks, tractors, cars, and stationary sources such as power plants are all sources, although they are currently all subject to different NOx emissions standards in the U.S. 1 In general, the health and environmental damages caused by a specific amount of a given pollutant at a given location at a given point in time are the same regardless of its source. Cost-effective regulation of NOx emissions should therefore equate the marginal cost of abatement across sources that are similar along those dimensions.
For decades, economists have emphasized the efficiency gains associated with marketbased environmental policies. Indeed, the large-scale shift away from the more traditional, more prescriptive "command-and-control" approaches for regulating stationary point sources of pollution (such as technology standards) towards market-based approaches (such as cap-and-trade programs) has largely been justified on these grounds. A similar transition to market-based policy instruments has not occurred for mobile sources such as passenger vehicles. While there have been several analyses measuring how much more efficiently market-based programs coordinate pollution abatement across point sources subject to the same environmental regulatory program, 2 far less work has been done to evaluate how efficiently abatement activity is coordinated across regulatory programs and sectors. This paper aims to fill that gap.
We analyze regulations designed to reduce NOx emissions from point and mobile sources, respectively. Nitrogen oxides, a byproduct of fossil fuel combustion, are precursors to the formation of fine particulate matter and ground-level ozone. Exposure to elevated concentrations of either pollutant has been linked to significant human health and ecosystem damages (see, for example, B. Brunekreef and S.T. Holgate 2002, World Health Organization 2003) . Under the observed regulatory regime, we estimate that the marginal cost of abating NOx emissions from power plants is more than double the marginal cost of abating NOx emissions from passenger vehicles. We investigate the efficiency and distributional implications of failing to equate marginal abatement costs across source types.
There are several reasons why we might observe differential regulatory treatment of different pollution sources in practice. First, if damages caused per unit of pollution vary significantly across mobile and point sources, differential regulatory treatment of source types is warranted. Section V.A of the paper summarizes the findings of an increasingly sophisticated scientific literature that investigates how NOx emissions impact the production, transport, and deposition of harmful pollutants such as particulate matter and ground-level ozone. Although the available evidence is far from conclusive, the current state of the science does not support the hypothesis that damages caused per unit of NOx emissions vary significantly across mobile versus point sources. To the extent there is a difference, it appears that marginal damages are higher from mobile source emissions than from power plant emissions.
Second, positive political economy theories of regulation such as G.J. Stigler (1971) suggest that regulations that impose costs on a small, well organized and politically powerful interest group and for which the benefits are diffuse are less likely to be adopted than regulations for which the costs are diffuse and the benefits concentrated. Stringent environmental regulation may be less likely to apply to politically powerful firms who vehemently oppose the regulation. In the United States, the automobile manufacturing industry is more concentrated than wholesale electricity generation. Perhaps more importantly, domestic vehicle manufacturers are more likely to see their profits negatively impacted by stringent environmental regulations, whereas electricity producers operat-2 Detailed analyses of the efficiency of the Acid Rain Program include R.N. Stavins (1998) , N.O. Keohane (2002) and C. Carlson, D. Burtraw, M. Cropper and K.L. Palmer (2000) . M. Fowlie (2010) and A. Krupnick, V. McConnell, M. Cannon, T. Stoessell, M. Batz et al. (2005) look at the NOx Budget Program.
ing in economically regulated industry environments can expect to recover environmental compliance costs in the form of higher prices.
Finally, from a practical or political transaction costs perspective, the costs associated with implementing regulations may vary. For instance, the U.S. may need to coordinate with other countries to regulate NOx emissions from ships or airplanes. By contrast, power plants and passenger vehicles fall squarely within the jurisdiction of state and federal environmental regulators.
We aim to measure the extent to which current U.S. environmental policy deviates from the theoretical optimum by comparing the marginal costs of abating NOx emissions from power plants to the marginal cost of abating NOx emissions from passenger vehicles. Specifically, we compare the ex ante cost of reducing NOx under the Federal Tier 2 passenger vehicle emissions reduction program to the ex ante cost of reducing NOx at power plants subject to the NOx Budget Program. Both programs were promulgated in 2004, pursuant to the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA). Both programs represent incremental steps taken to increase the stringency of the NOx regulations for mobile and industrial point sources, respectively.
We construct estimates of NOx marginal abatement costs for power plants using detailed unit-level engineering data and compare them to estimates for light-duty car and truck NOx abatement costs based on engineering analyses performed for the regulatory impact analysis of Tier 2. Our estimates of the marginal abatement costs for point sources are more than double those of mobile sources.
A core strength of this paper is that the engineering data allow us to calculate not only the marginal cost of pollution abatement that corresponds with the level of NOx reductions mandated by the existing regulations we observe, but also the costs of abatement options that provide too little or too much reduction (i.e. costs associated with infra-or extra-marginal options). Put differently, because we estimate marginal abatement cost curves (and not just the observed equilibrium points along these curves) we are able to estimate the efficiency losses from the current policy approach to regulating NOx emissions.
We find there is considerable scope for efficiency gains. Our preferred estimates suggest that inefficiencies amount to $1.6 billion, or six percent of the total costs incurred to comply with both programs. Equating marginal abatement costs across source types would significantly alter how the costs of achieving mandated emissions reductions are allocated across sectors. The emissions cap in the electricity sector becomes far less stringent (permitted emissions in the electricity sector increase by approximately 45 percent), whereas emissions reduction obligations in the automotive sector increase by approximately 15 percent.
Our results highlight the potential gains from improved regulatory coordination across sectors. These findings have important implications for climate change policy. Greenhouse gas emissions are emitted by many sectors of the economy. The appropriate scope of carbon dioxide emissions trading is a matter of increasing controversy. 3 For NOx emissions, the focus of this paper, it would probably be impractical to include vehicles in a cap-and-trade program, since it would require monitoring emissions from individual vehicles. In contrast, carbon dioxide emissions from vehicles are directly proportional to the fuel that is burned (in other words, there is no post-combustion removal technology for CO 2 emissions from vehicles), so a tax on transportation fuels could be linked to the prices in the active cap-and-trade market. This is in fact what recent draft legislation in the U.S. Senate proposed. In California, by contrast, the emissions from burning transportation fuels will initially be regulated outside of the proposed cap-and-trade program.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I describes the NOx Budget Program and the Tier 2 vehicle emissions reduction programs. Section 3 describes generically how we will use estimates of the marginal abatement cost curves to measure efficiency losses. In Section III, we elaborate on the advantages of using engineering estimates in this application. Section IV presents the main results of the paper. We first explain how we construct the marginal abatement cost curves for both power plants and for vehicles, and then presents our results. Section V discusses ancillary information we have collected to buttress assumptions underlying the results in Section IV. Section VI discusses several additional programs aimed at reducing NOx, and Section VII concludes.
I. Regulating Nitrogen Oxide Emissions
Nitrogen oxides (NOx) contain nitrogen and oxygen in varying amounts. NOx form when fuels are burned at high temperatures. In 2002, just before the programs we study were implemented, motorized passenger vehicles and electricity generation were responsible for approximately 18 percent and 23 percent, respectively, of man-made NOx emissions. Additional NOx emitters include other motorized vehicles and industrial sources (see Figure 1) .
NOx is the only criteria pollutant for which nationwide emissions have actually increased since the passage of the 1970 Clean Air Act. 4 NOx emissions cause environmental and health damages through a number of channels. First, NOx reacts with volatile organic compounds (VOCs) in the presence of sunlight to form tropospheric ozone. Exposure to elevated ambient ozone concentrations has been linked to increased hospitalization for respiratory ailments, irreversible reductions in lung capacity, and ecological damages (A. Gryparis, B. Forsberg, K. Katsouyanni, A. Analitis, G. Touloumi, J. Schwartz, E. Samoli, S. Medina, H.R. Anderson, E.M. Niciu et al. 2004 , World Health Organization 2003 . 5 Second, NOx emissions can react with other compounds in the atmosphere to form nitrate particulate matter (PM). Studies have found that exposure to fine particulates is correlated with increased infant mortality (K.Y. Chay and M. Greenstone 2003) and with increased adult mortality from respiratory or cardiopulmonary disease (M. Lippmann and RB Schlesinger 2000) . NOx emissions can also contribute to a range of other health and environmental problems, including acid deposition and nutrient loading in waterways.
A. Reducing NOx emissions from point sources
The 1990 CAAA placed unprecedented emphasis on reducing NOx emissions and bringing urban areas into compliance with federal ozone standards. The Amendments established thoroughly revised NOx emissions standards for existing point sources in nonattainment areas and all new sources. 6 Because it was anticipated that these measures would be insufficient to bring the northeastern region of the United States into attainment with federal ozone standards, the Amendments also established the Ozone Transport Commission (OTC) to assess the degree of ozone transport in the northeast and to recommend strategies to mitigate regional ozone problems. In December 1999, the U.S. EPA signed the "Tier 2" standard which further increased the stringency of exhaust emission standards for new passenger cars and light-duty vehicles. 7 The Tier 2 NOx emissions standard of 0.07 grams per mile (gpm) represented a 77 percent reduction for cars and a 65-95 percent reduction for trucks from the existing NLEV standards. The Tier 2 standards were phased in beginning in 2004.
II. Measuring Efficiency from Regulatory Coordination
Ignoring corner solutions, efficiency is achieved when marginal abatement costs are set equal to the marginal damage costs across all emissions sources. If the value of the damages per unit of NOx emitted by point sources is approximately equal to the value of the damages per unit of NOx emitted by mobile sources, economic efficiency would dictate that marginal abatement costs should be set approximately equal across the two source types. Section 6.1 summarizes the scientific evidence documenting the relative impacts of mobile and point source NOx emissions. Although the evidence is not conclusive, it generally suggests that there is no significant difference in the social benefits from incremental emissions reductions achieved by sources regulated under the two programs we consider. Thus, we assume that these values do not differ significantly in our initial analysis.
Let the level of emissions reductions required by regulations of source type s beR s . The function M AC s (R s ) specifies the marginal cost of abating NOx emissions among sources of type s by a quantity (reduction) R s . Figure 2 illustrates a case where M AC x (R x ) < M AC y (R y ), x = y. The difference between area B and area A reflects the economic inefficiency resulting from a lack of regulatory program coordination. This efficiency loss L is equal to:
where ∆R is defined such that:
In our applied analysis, we use p and m to denote point and mobile sources, respectively; s ∈ {p, m}. To measure L, we first construct estimates of the functions M AC p (R p ) and M AC m (R m ). We then identify the levels of emissions reductionsR p andR m that correspond to the constraints imposed by the NBP and Tier 2 standards, respectively. Upon finding that M AC p (R p ) > M AC m (R m ), we define x = m and y = p and estimate (1).
When estimating (1), we take the total level of mandated NOx reductions (R p +R m ) as given. Put differently, we are interested in finding the most cost effective means of achieving the mandated level of NOx emissions reductions. We do not attempt to determine whether this mandated level is efficient; this would require estimating both marginal abatement cost curves and marginal damage curves. Estimating the damages associated with different levels of NOx concentrations is complex, controversial, and beyond the scope of this paper (N.Z. Muller and R. Mendelsohn 2009) . However, past analysis suggests that the emissions cap imposed under the NOx Budget Program is approximately optimal based on ex ante available damage estimates (Krupnick et al. 2005) .
Finally, our analysis focuses on the supply-side impacts exclusively. To the extent that environmental compliance costs incurred by producers are passed through to cus-tomers, emissions reductions may also be achieved through changes in consumer behavior (such as conservation and substitution). In equilibrium, the marginal abatement cost on the supply-side should be set equal to the marginal cost-in terms of foregone consumer surplus-of achieving additional emissions reductions through demand reductions. For reasons we elaborate upon below, the demand-side impacts of the two policies we consider are likely to be negligible and thus ignorable.
III. Engineering versus Econometric Evidence
Our research design relies on engineering models and related data that were available ex ante, that is, before the regulations were put in place. It is useful to consider the advantages and disadvantages of using engineering estimates as compared to the more traditional approach in the economics literature which involves constructing econometric estimates of the parameters of an underlying cost function using data collected ex post. Although the econometric approach has its advantages, we argue that engineering cost estimates are more appropriate for our purposes. 8 Our objective is to assess the efficacy of regulatory coordination. To execute our analysis, we need to estimate abatement cost curves for both the electricity and automotive sectors. This requires estimating both the costs of technologies that were adopted and the costs of available abatement options that were not implemented. One approach to constructing these curves could have involved estimating an econometric model using data describing the observed compliance decisions that coal plant operators and automotive manufacturers actually made. The marginal abatement cost curve implied by these estimates is likely to be biased downwards if plant operators install the abatement technologies that are best suited for their plant, given both observable and unobservable (to the econometrician) factors. Using ex post data to impute the costs of abatement options that were not chosen would require very strong assumptions regarding the conditional independence of observed costs and unobserved determinants of the compliance decision.
An alternative approach makes use of engineering estimates. Prior to the implementation of the NBP and Tier 2 programs, detailed analyses and field testing of available pollution control technologies had been carried out by industry trade groups, emissions control equipment manufacturers, and other stakeholders. Highly disaggregated estimates of installation costs, variable operating costs, and performance parameters across boiler or vehicle type were well documented. It is these rich data on expected costs that we use in our analysis. These estimates fail to capture unanticipated changes in costs, optimization errors, or behavioral responses and idiosyncrasies that may cause electricity producers and automotive manufacturers to deviate from the engineering ideal. 9 However, omission of these factors is appropriate in an analysis of whether these two NOx regulations were coordinated cost effectively given the information that was available to policymakers when the programs were being designed and implemented.
IV. Results

A. Constructing a marginal abatement cost curve for power plants
We estimate NOx abatement costs for 632 coal-fired generating units in the NBP. 10 Although gas-and oil-fired generators and other industrial point sources are also included in the NBP, these 632 coal-fired units represent over 90 percent of the NOx emissions regulated under the program. The U.S. EPA reports that coal-fired electricity generators account for all of the NOx emissions reductions achieved in the early years of the program, and over 94 percent of the NOx emissions reductions over the first five years (U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency 2005, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2008).
Unit-level compliance choice sets
Coal plant managers had a variety of NOx control technologies to choose from when they were deciding how to comply with the NBP. The capital costs, variable operating costs and emissions reduction efficiencies associated with different pollution control technologies vary significantly, both across NOx technology types and across generating units with different technical characteristics. Also, not all control technologies are compatible with all boiler types. In total, fifteen different compliance strategies are observed in the data. These strategies include: combustion modification, combustion modification combined with low NOx burners, four different types of low NOx burner technologies, low NOx burners combined with Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR), overfire air, overfire air combined with low NOx burners, SCR, Selective Non-Catalytic Reduction Technology (SNCR), SCR with overfire air, SNCR with overfire air, and no retrofits. 11 In the foregoing analysis, we will assume that reductions in NOx emissions are achieved through pollution control technology retrofits and combustion modifications. We do not consider plant retirement or reduced unit utilization rates as compliance options. This assumption finds empirical support in the NOx Budget Program. 12 We generate unit-specific engineering estimates of technology installation and operating costs using detailed unit-and plant-level data. In the late 1990s, to help generators prepare to comply with market-based NOx regulations, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 13 developed a software program to generate cost estimates for all major NOx control options, conditional on unit-and plant-level characteristics. 14 Cost calculations require detailed data on over 60 unit-and plant-level operating characteristics, fuel inputs, boiler specifications, plant operating costs, etc. Appendix A includes a detailed 10 Our analysis focuses exclusively on coal-fired plants due to data availability constraints. The unit-level cost data required to carry out this analysis are not available for gas-and oil-fired generators.
11 Compliance options that incorporate SCR technology can reduce emissions by up to ninety percent. NOx emissions rates can be reduced by thirty-five percent through the adoption of SNCR. Pre-combustion control technologies such as low NOx burners or combustion modifications can reduce emissions by fifteen to fifty percent, depending on a boiler's technical specifications and operating characteristics.
12 EPA modeling exercises predicted that less than 0.3 percent of capacity would be prematurely retired as a result of this program (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998). To date, no program-related retirements have been reported. Because coal-fired generation tends to serve load on an around-the-clock basis, the utilization rates of these coal plants have not been significantly affected by this regulation (Fowlie 2010) .
13 EPRI is an organization that was created and is funded by public and private electric utilities to conduct electricity-related R&D.
14 Anecdotal evidence suggests that this software has been used not only by plant managers, but also by regulators to evaluate proposed compliance costs for the utilities they regulate (R. Himes 2004 , Daniel Musatti 2004 , Ravi Srivastava 2004 .
description of the data. Post-retrofit emissions rates are estimated using the EPRI software, together with EPA's Integrated Planning Model (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2003).
We use the EPRI software to first identify which NOx control technologies are compatible with each boiler, and then to generate cost estimates for each unit, for each viable control technology. Let j = 1...J n index the NOx control technology options available to the nth electricity generating unit. Let K nj represent the engineering cost estimates of required capital investments specific to unit n and technology j; v nj is the corresponding variable operating cost estimate (per kWh) and e nj represents the corresponding postretrofit emissions rate. Let e n0 represent the pre-retrofit emissions rate; this is the amount of NOx the nth unit emits per kWh of electricity generated if it installs no new pollution controls. For each unit, for each compliance option, we calculate the net present value (NPV) of estimated pollution control costs c nj and emissions reductions R nj as follows:
We assume that generating units are retired at 65 years, so T n is set equal to 65 minus the nth unit's age in 2000. 15 Historic electricity production during the ozone season, Q n , is used to proxy for expected ozone season production. To facilitate cost comparisons across point-source and mobile-source emissions reduction cost estimates, we set r = 0.07. 16 The second and third columns of Table 1 present engineering estimates of the NPV costs c and NPV emissions reductions R associated with the technology options available to a 510 MW unit in our dataset with T n = 31. These options, which are mutually exclusive, are listed in order of increasing emissions reduction R j . This particular unit, which is representative of other units in the dataset, has nine compliance options. At one extreme, if the firm relies entirely on the permit market for compliance, c 0 = R 0 = 0. At the other extreme, the firm makes a large capital investment in pollution control equipment and reduces emissions by over 38 million pounds.
Modeling the compliance decision
A simple, static framework is used to model a plant manager's choice of compliance strategy. We assume that the manager of unit n chooses the compliance option that minimizes the NPV of anticipated compliance costs:
Note that we are not attributing any costs to NOx reductions from the new plants replacing these units once they retire. This is equivalent to assuming that the new capacity investment will comply with new source standards, and that the cap will cease to bind as these new plants make up a larger share of the fleet. 16 The U.S. EPA uses a discount rate of seven percent in their analysis of the Tier 2 standard.
where the second argument in parentheses reflects the cost of permits which the units must hold to offset any uncontrolled emissions and j = 0 identifies the option that involves a complete reliance on the permit market for compliance. Let j * n identify the compliance strategy chosen by the nth firm: j * n ∈ {0...J n }. The pollution permit price τ and the vector of investment decisions j * = (j * 1 , ..., j * N ) describe the equilibrium for the permit market if for each n = 1...N, j * n solves [2] subject to the constraint that
This model assumes that all plant managers commit to a compliance strategy at the beginning of the program. This rules out any option value; by assumption, plants do not wait for more information about market conditions before committing to costly investments in pollution control equipment. This is an appropriate assumption within our analytical framework because there is no uncertainty about future abatement costs; the entire abatement cost curve is explicitly represented and plants are assumed to choose the cost minimizing compliance option.
In fact, the compliance decisions that were actually made are consistent with our assumption that plant managers made a one-shot decision at the outset of the program. In preparation for the program, there was unprecedented investment in pollution control equipment (Natural Gas Week 2004). As a result, there was no new investment initiated after the regulations went into effect.
The model further assumes that plant managers expected permit prices to remain constant over time (in real terms) when they made their compliance decision. This is an oversimplification, but not an unreasonable first-order approximation. Permits of future vintages were trading actively during the period that firms were making their compliance decisions. If futures permit prices are plotted (in nominal terms) against vintage (or maturity), trends are decreasing at a decreasing rate. A discount rate of 10 percent best fits the data.
Consider again the representative unit in Table 1 . We will soon demonstrate that, when all abatement options available to all coal plants in the program are taken together, the aggregate marginal abatement cost curve is well-approximated by a strictly monotonic function. Given this property, several of the compliance options available to this representative unit will not be cost minimizing under any aggregate cap. The fourth column reports the average cost c nj R nj for each compliance option. Assuming compliance cost-minimizing behavior, options 1, 2, 4, and 5 will never be chosen by this unit. To see why, consider option 4. With an average cost of $0.62/lb NOx reduced, this option is dominated by option 6, which delivers greater emissions reductions at a lower average cost of $0.55/lb (albeit at greater total cost). In other words, if this unit were ever required to abate more than 14 million but less than 20 million pounds, it would be more cost-effective for it to buy (or sell) permits than to use either options 4 or 5, given the monotonicity of the aggregate marginal abatement cost curve.
Let J n represent the subset of J n such that for all j n ∈ J n there exists a permit price τ such that j n is the compliance cost minimizing choice. Any compliance choice that is not included in J n will not be chosen by a compliance cost minimizing plant manager. In the example depicted in Table 1 , J = {0, 3, 6, 7, 8}.
We calculate unit-and choice-specific marginal abatement costs mac nj for all n, for all j n ∈ J n , where marginal abatement costs are defined as:
The numerator represents the additional costs incurred from choosing the next cleanest option in J n . The denominator represents the additional emissions reductions achieved. Note that the compliance cost-minimizing choice for the nth unit is j n if mac nj < τ < mac nj +1 . The final column of Table 1 reports the marginal abatement costs for the relevant compliance alternatives available to this particular unit.
Constructing the aggregate marginal abatement cost curve
Our aggregate marginal abatement cost curve reflects the horizontal summation of these unit-specific marginal abatement cost schedules. Mechanically, we construct an aggregate marginal abatement cost curve using a model of the NBP pollution permit market mechanism that coordinates the unit-level environmental compliance decisions. We simulate pollution permit market clearing for a range of possible values ofĒ.
We begin by setting the cap equal to uncontrolled emissionsĒ 0 = 632 n=1 e n0 · Q n . In this benchmark case, the equilibrium permit price is τ = $0 and j * = j 0 ∀ n. The cap is then incrementally decreased toĒ 1 =Ē 0 − ε. A strictly positive permit price is required to deliver a level of aggregate emissions that satisfies the new constraint
The permit price is incrementally increased above the initial starting price of $0. Unitlevel compliance choices are simulated, conditional on this permit price. If the emissions that correspond to the simulated compliance choices satisfies the constraint imposed bȳ E 1 , the simulation stops. Otherwise, the permit price is incrementally increased once more. The permit price that clears the market, conditional on the mandated reduction is τ * (ε). The vector of equilibrium compliance choices is j * with a corresponding vector of equilibrium emissions e nj * .This entire process is repeated Z times. Each time, we make the cap incrementally more stringent and solve for the constrained equilibrium price. Let z index the iteration. The resulting {Ē z , τ * z } pairs trace out a marginal abatement cost curve for this group of facilities. Figure 3 plots aggregate abatement (Ē 0 −Ē z ) versus equilibrium permit price τ * z for Z = 2000 and ε = 1 million lbs of NOx. To facilitate a direct comparison with emissions reductions achieved under Tier 2, emissions reductions are measured as a net present value using a seven percent discount rate. For each level ofĒ, the corresponding permit price represents the minimum τ required to induce sufficient abatement among this group of point sources such that aggregate emissions equalĒ. The vertical line corresponds to our measure of R * p , the emissions cap that was imposed by the NBP. In our simulations, this cap is set equal to the discounted emissions reductions associated with the technology adoption decisions that these units actually made. 18 The equilibrium permit price τ (R * p ) that corresponds to these choices (and the corresponding emissions reductions) is $0.95 per pound. The horizontal line corresponds to the marginal abatement cost schedule for mobile sources which we introduce in section IV.B. The simulated equilibrium permit price (τ (R * p ) = $0.94 per pound) is quite close to the permit price that was actually observed in the first five years of the NOx Budget Program ($1.04 per pound). 19 While it is reassuring that our simulated NOx permit price is close to the average observed price, several caveats are in order. First, our analysis assumes that the permit market will coordinate firm-level abatement decisions so as to achieve the mandated emissions reductions at minimum cost. This approach is appropriate for this analysis that compares policy instruments using information available to policy makers ex ante. However, previous work suggests that observed compliance decisions deviate considerably from those predicted by our cost minimization model (Fowlie 2010) . 20 Because our model omits factors that serve to undermine the cost-effectiveness of permit market equilibrium outcomes (such as regulatory distortions in the product market and optimization error), our abatement cost estimates for the electricity sector will be lower than realized costs. Working in the opposite direction, there is evidence to suggest the engineering cost estimates reflected in our marginal abatement cost curve may overstate realized costs (J. Linn 2008).
B. Constructing a marginal abatement cost curve for mobile sources
To construct the marginal abatement cost curve for passenger vehicles, we rely on the Tier 2 Regulatory Impact Analysis performed by the EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1999a). 21 As part of the regulatory process, the EPA forecast total NOx savings and the costs associated with these savings. We discuss each of these in this section.
The costs associated with compliance can be split into increases in vehicles costs, fixed costs associated with engineering, and fixed costs associated with certification. While we refer the reader to the EPA's analysis for all of the particulars, we highlight the important assumptions regarding consumer purchasing behavior and vehicle-level cost of compliance.
As with point sources, there are a variety of ways auto manufacturers can alter vehicles to comply with the new legislation. The least cost method for complying is likely to vary by both a vehicle's size and type of engine. To account for this, the EPA calculates estimates of the least cost method of compliance separately for each vehicle class/number Environmental Protection Agency, the Energy Information Administration, the Institute for Clean Air Companies and M.J. Bradley and Associates. These choices imply discounted NOx emissions reductions of 13.3 billion pounds. An alternative approach to defining the "observed" cap would involve computing the discounted sum of the mandated annual emissions caps going forward. This is complicated by the fact that the regulation only defines caps for the first few years of the program.
19 Permit price data are available from Evolution Markets LLC. 20 A similar outcome was observed in the critically acclaimed Acid Rain Program. Researchers have documented a significant discrepancy between the least-cost solution under emissions trading and the ex post observed outcome (Carlson et al. 2000) .
21 Executive Order 12866 requires the US Environmental Protection Agency to provide the Office of Management and Budget with detailed Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIAs) for all new "economically significant" regulatory proposals. A proposal is deemed to be economically significant if annual costs are expected to exceed $100M. Both Tier 2 and the NBP fall into this category. of cylinder combination. 22 The per vehicle cost estimates are reported in Table 2 . 23 After calculating the incremental engineering costs for each vehicle type, the EPA makes two assumptions in the process of transforming the variable costs to marginal abatement costs. First, the incremental costs are increased by 26 percent to account for "overhead and profits." Below we present results that use the EPA's assumed markup and results that assume a markup of zero. We take the estimates without the markups as the most accurate estimate of the marginal cost of abatement, as any markup represents a transfer, rather than a true economic costs. The relevant cost for efficiency calculations is the marginal social cost of abatement, not the marginal cost of abatement faced by consumers.
The EPA also assumes that manufacturers experience learning over the course of Tier 2, beginning in the third year of implementation. Specifically, they assume that each time output doubles a manufacturer experiences a 20 percent reduction in incremental vehicle costs. If their assumed learning rate is either too large or too small, this assumption will tend to under-or overstate the marginal cost of abatement for mobile sources.
In addition to vehicle equipment costs, the EPA estimates quasi-fixed costs associated with Tier 2. These costs include R&D, tooling and certification costs. R&D costs are assumed to be $5 million per vehicle line (100,000 vehicles), tooling costs are assumed to be $2 million per vehicle line and certification costs are assumed to be $15 million industry wide. 24 When calculating the discounted value of costs, the EPA assumes that fixed costs are spread evenly over the first five years. The effects of learning and fixed costs can be seen by examining vehicles costs over time. Table 3 reports vehicle costs, by vehicle type, in years one, three and six. Costs from year one to year three fall by between $5 and $34 because of learning. Costs fall significantly in year six because fixed costs drop to zero. Combined, the assumptions on variable and fixed costs, markups and learning yield vehicle costs that vary by vehicle type/engine type and year.
A final requirement needed to generate estimates of the total discounted costs associated with Tier 2 is a model of consumer vehicle purchase behavior. For this, the EPA relies on a model of driving and purchasing behavior known as MOBILE5. 25 The vehicle cost and sales data imply total annual costs beginning at $269 million, when Tier 2 is being phased in, and peaking at $1,579 million in 2009; annual costs begin to fall after 2009 because of learning.
The EPA uses the cost estimates associated with Tier 2 to calculate an average cost of the proposed NOx reductions; this requires an estimate of the total NOx saved under the program. The amount of NOx saved under Tier 2 will depend on both driving habits and the stock of vehicles in each year. Driving habits come from the MOBILE6 22 There are a number of changes that can be made to autos to reduce NOx; changes to the catalytic converter system are likely to be most important. Other areas that manufacturers can alter include: improvements to the fuel injection system, secondary air injection, insulating the exhaust system, engine combustion chamber improvements and exhaust gas recirculation.
23 The NBP calculations are in $2000s, while the Tier 2 calculations are in $1997s. However, according to the BLS PPI calculations, there was no change in the PPI over the intervening years.
24 The EPA has attempted to estimate these costs as incremental fixed costs; that is, those additional fixed costs associated with Tier 2. In each case, however, they suggest that they have erred on the side of overstating these costs.
25 The cost estimates also require an assumption about the phase in of the standards. The EPA assumes that manufacturers meet the requirements by starting with the smaller vehicles and moving to the larger vehicles. If anything, this will overstate the cost of achieving a given emissions level, as it is not necessarily the cost-minimizing approach.
model 26 , while the EPA uses NHTSA survivor rates for each vehicle. This generates annual emissions for the assumed stock of vehicles, which is then summed using a seven percent discount rate. 27 Under these assumptions and the standard EPA assumption when dealing with mobile sources that treats NOx and non-methane hydrocarbons as the same, the EPA forecasts a lifetime discounted reductions for NOx+NMHC to be 47 billion pounds. Savings increase over time as more and more Tier 2 vehicles are on the road.
Calculating the marginal abatement cost for the regulatory program is complicated by the fact that Tier 2 also yields reductions in other pollutants, most notably sulfur and particulate matter. 28 There are three potential ways to deal with this. The first, though probably least accurate, is to simply ignore them; we refer to this strategy as the "uncredited MAC." A second is to assign a value for these other pollutant reductions and reduce the costs associated with Tier 2 by this amount; this is strategy taken by the EPA and we refer to this strategy as the "credited MAC." To do this, the EPA forecasts the amount of each pollutant saved and credits the costs associated with Tier 2; they assume marginal damages of $4,800/ton and $10,000/ton for sulfur and particulate matter, respectively.
The structure of Tier 2 allows for a third strategy. Given that Tier 2 consisted of two distinct regulatory changes, desulfurization of fuels and changes in vehicle emissions equipment, we can calculate the abatement costs assuming that the EPA only implemented the vehicle portion of the regulations. We refer to this strategy as the "separated MAC."
Calculating the level of abatement absent desulfurization requires calculating (a) the amount of the Tier 2 NOx reductions coming from non-Tier 2 vehicles burning desulfurized fuel and (b) the increase in NOx emissions from Tier 2 vehicles that would occur if these vehicles ran on the existing fuels. Both require estimates of how emissions change with the sulfur content of the fuel; the former also requires information on the driving and retirement patterns for non-Tier 2 vehicles. We use information in the RIA and the MOBILE6 model to estimate the emissions reductions that would have occurred absent desulfurization.
The RIA provides estimates of the NOx savings associated with shifting non-Tier 2 vehicles to desulfurized fuel. Given these estimates, we use the EPA's MOBILE6 model of driving patterns and retirements of existing vehicles to calculate the increase in emissions from assuming the savings from existing vehicles is zero. These calculations imply that 12.7 percent of the NOx savings associated with Tier 2 are the result of non-Tier 2 automobiles running on desulfurized fuel. Given the estimate of the savings from the existing vehicle stock, we calculate how the remaining 87.3 percent would be affected. We again use the EPA's estimates of how NOx emissions change with the sulfur content of fuels; we then apply these to Tier 2 vehicles. The EPA estimates that desulfurization of the fuels reduces NOx emissions from Tier 2 vehicles by 25.2 percent. Combined these 26 Both MOBILE5 and MOBILE6 models were used in the RIA. 27 Because Tier 2 does not apply to California, Alaska and Hawaii, the EPA adjusts their numbers to represent emission levels for the remaining 47 states.
28 These co-benefits are less of an issue in the case of the NOx Budget Program. In fact, there can be marginal dis-benefits. The operation of NOx abatement technologies reduces coal plant operating efficiencies by an estimated one percent (WHJ Graus and E. Worrell 2007) , which will likely lead to marginal increases in co-pollutant emissions. The installation of SCR at coal plants that use flue-gas desulfurization can also have a direct effect on co-emissions, increasing S03 vapor emissions and mercury capture rates.
suggest that the NOx savings under a policy that only altered vehicles emission controls would have been 65.3 percent absent desulfurization. 29 Once the level of abatement is known for our three estimation strategies, we require information on costs. The RIA explicitly reports both credited and uncredited average cost of NOx abatement, as well as separating the costs for the vehicle emissions equipment and desulfurization portions of the regulation. We use this information and additional information in the RIA to subtract out the assumed markup to generate a total cost for each of the three methods of accounting for sulfur and PM. Specifically, Table V-53 of the RIA reports the annualized costs separately for the NOx and sulfur portions of the legislation for the years 2004 to 2024; Table V-51 reports annual costs for desulfurization for 2004 to 2030. The text of the RIA also reports that the discounted value of total costs associated with the entire legislation are $48.5 billion. 30 Using these data, we are able to change the assumption about markups. Table 4 reports the average costs for each of our methods. Evident from this is that the method for controlling for sulfur and particulate matter is very important. Ignoring the reductions in both sulfur and particulate matter implies a marginal abatement cost of $1.02/lbs. Using the EPA's values for the sulfur and particulate matter reduces this cost to $0.66/lbs; 31 subtracting out the assumed markup reduces this further to $0.58/lbs.
Treating the vehicle and fuel regulations separately yields much lower average cost estimates. Allowing for the assumed margin, the average cost is $0.55/lbs. Removing the margin reduces this to $0.45/lbs. These results imply that the burden placed on refiners was much larger than the burden placed on automobile manufacturers. This is consistent with the political economy story that regulatory stringency will be a function of industry concentration. Similar to the electricity industry, the gasoline refining industry is much less concentrated than the automobile industry. Furthermore, given the inelastic nature of gasoline demand, much of the desulfurization costs likely fell onto consumers. Both of these industry features suggest that regulators will face less resistance when setting regulations on the refining market. This, too, represents an inefficiency; one that we do not attempt to quantify.
By separating the automobile manufacturer and desulfurization costs, we are able to isolate the costs incurred by automobile manufacturers and compare them to the costs incurred by electricity generators. For this reason, our preferred estimates of the costs associated with NOx abatement from the automobile sector is $0.45/lbs.
The RIA gives us one point on the total/average cost curve, but to calculate the level of inefficiencies across the two sectors requires a marginal abatement cost schedule for passenger vehicles. The RIA, states that "in the case of our standards, both the emission reductions and the fuel cost as a function of sulfur content are nearly linear, though 29 The EPA relies on a variety of assumptions to estimate the NOx reductions from Tier 2. These include: the phase-in of Tier 2 vehicles, the efficacy of emission systems on existing vehicle stock, driving habits and how sulfur affects catalytic converters. In general, our estimates are robust to the assumptions that only affect existing vehicles because the NOx savings from existing vehicles are low.
The main parameter of interest for Tier 2 vehicles is how sulfur affects catalytic converter operation; for the parameter the EPA does not provide much insight regarding the range of possibilities. Changing this parameter by ten percent in either direction does not appreciably change our conclusions.
30 The report also describes annual costs for NOx in Table V-21(A) . If we instead use these, we do not get quite the same discounted sum compared to subtracting out the sulfur costs from the EPA's reported total; using the vehicle cost number result in costs that are $2.3 billion lower. To be conservative, we use the higher of the two total NOx cost numbers.
31 These PM credits are the result of reducing non-NOx PM via increases in engine efficiency.
the vehicle costs do contain some nonlinearity" (page VI-3). If we assume that the nonlinearity in the vehicle costs is minimal, this implies that total costs are linear in NOx abatement levels, and that marginal costs are constant and equal to the average cost number reported in Table 4 . Insofar as the marginal cost curve is upward sloping, we will tend to overstate the inefficiencies present. Section V presents additional evidence to help assess the accuracy of the constant marginal cost assumption.
C. Efficiency gains from equalizing marginal abatement costs
With our estimates of the marginal abatement costs for the two industries in hand, we can now make comparisons across programs. More specifically, we examine the implications of equalizing marginal costs across source types vis-a-vis the observed regulatory regime. The efficiency implications are best viewed graphically. Returning to Figure 3 , we have plotted the marginal abatement cost schedule for vehicles as a straight line at $0.45/lbs based on the analysis above.
Equalizing marginal abatement costs across source types would require reducing the emissions abatement requirements for power plants by about one half, from to 6.7 million tons to 3.3 million tons. Emissions reductions required of vehicles would be increased by this amount. The potential efficiency gains associated with this reallocation of emissions abatement activity, expressed as a net present value, is estimated to be $1.6 billion. 32 To put this number in perspective, this represents roughly six percent of total compliance costs across the two programs.
Reallocating emissions abatement responsibilities across sectors also has distributional implications. Moving from A to B in Figure 3 reduces the abatement costs incurred in the electricity sector by approximately $4.6 billion, or 78 percent. In the automotive sector, the associated abatement cost increase by approximately $3 billion, or 15 percent.
V. Additional Evidence on Key Assumptions
In this section we present additional evidence on the key assumptions that underly our inefficiency calculation, addressing the assumptions on the symmetric marginal damages of NOx emissions across sources and geographic location, marginal abatement costs for vehicles, and the decision to ignore the demand side of the market.
A. Marginal damages are approximately equal across point and mobile source emissions
To assess the plausibility of the assumption that marginal damages are approximately equal across power plants and vehicles, we first consider damages associated with reduced particulate matter formation and ozone formation separately. Then, in a more comprehensive comparison, we use the Air Pollution Emissions Experiments and Policy (APEEP) model to estimate the average monetary value of an incremental reduction in NOx emissions at coal-fired plants regulated under the NBP and vehicles regulated under Tier 2, respectively (N.Z. Muller and R. Mendelsohn 2006) .
Particulate matter-related damages
32 Table 4 reports results of the efficiency losses based on other estimates for the MAC for mobile sources.
The regulatory impact analyses conducted in the planning stages of both Tier 2 and the NOx Budget Program provide estimates of how each policy impacts particulate matter concentrations (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1999a, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1999b). Direct comparisons of these estimates are complicated by the fact that the two analyses were conducted independently and measure impacts relative to different base years. Moreover, these two programs are significantly different in size and scope. 33 That said, comparisons of the ratio of population weighted average reductions to unweighted reductions across programs suggest that anticipated marginal benefits were slightly higher for Tier 2 as those reductions were more likely to affect population centers.
An academic study offers a more direct "apples to apples" comparison of relative marginal damages across source types. J.I. Levy, S.K. Wolff and J.S. Evans (2002) describe the formation and dispersion of nitrate particles for a random sample of coal-fired power plants and stretches of interstate highway across the United States. They analyze intake functions (the mass of secondary particulate matter inhaled per unit of emitted NOx) and conclude that they are not statistically significantly different across the two source types. They note, however, that the large grid scale (100 km by 100 km) over which the intake functions were calculated may underestimate the exposure from vehicular emissions. The findings of this study are consistent with our assumption that NOx emissions from vehicles regulated under Tier 2 cause similar (and perhaps even larger) particulate-related damages per unit of NOx reduced.
Ozone-related damages
Estimating the effects of NOx emissions reductions on ozone formation and exposure is more complicated. Ozone is formed by photochemical reactions involving two classes of precursors: volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and nitrogen oxides. An important feature of ozone chemistry is the complex and highly nonlinear relationship between precursor concentrations, temperature, and ozone production. Whereas ozone formation increases with NOx emissions in NOx sensitive photochemical regimes, the rate of ozone formation can decrease with increased NOx emissions when the ratio of NOx to VOCs is high.
There are several reasons why the average ozone-related damages per unit of NOx emissions might differ across vehicles regulated under Tier 2 and coal-fired power plants regulated under the NOx Budget Program. First, recent studies find that ozone production efficiency (i.e., the net production of O3 per unit of NOx emitted) are significantly higher in vehicular exhaust versus power plant plumes (M. Luria, R.J. Valente, R.L. Tan . Mobile sources emit both NOx and VOCs, resulting in immediate ozone production and higher ozone yields (Ryerson et al. 2003) . In contrast, coal-fired power plants emit highly concentrated NOx but almost no VOCs. Measurements taken in aircraft transects of emissions plumes and vehicular exhaust document substantial differences in the rate and magnitude of ozone production associated with NOx emissions from mobile and point sources. With 33 NOx reductions mandated under Tier 2 are more than three times as large as those mandated under the NBP. Tier 2 is also larger in scope; PM reductions were achieved directly (via new PM standards) and indirectly (via reductions in both NOx and SO 2 ). Under the NBP, all PM reductions are due to reductions in NOx precursors.
all other factors determining relative damages held constant, these documented differences in ozone production efficiency would imply that benefits per unit of NOx emissions reduction might be significantly higher under Tier 2 versus the NBP.
There are also differences in the spatial and temporal distribution of NOx emitted by NBP point sources and Tier 2 mobile sources. With respect to the temporal dimension, all of the NOx emissions reductions achieved under the NBP occur during "ozone season," whereas NOx emissions reductions from Tier 2 occur year round. Because the photochemical reaction that forms ozone requires sunlight and heat, NOx emissions occurring in colder months are unlikely to contribute to ozone problems. With respect to the spatial dimension, vehicular NOx emissions occur disproportionately in densely populated areas. Because mobile source NOx emissions occur where people are, and ozone formation from vehicular NOx emissions occurs very close to the source, ozone intake fractions are likely to be high for mobile sources. In contrast, coal plants tend to be located far from urban centers and ozone formed in power plant plumes is less likely to affect people. On the other hand, the NBP applied only to coal power plants located in the Eastern US, whereas Tier 2 applied nationwide (except in California, Alaska and Hawaii). Because more people live in the Eastern US, this could mean damages from coal plants would be higher.
An integrated assessment of damages caused by point and mobile sources
The Air Pollution Emissions Experiments and Policy (APEEP) model can be used to conduct a more integrated and comprehensive comparison of damages caused by incremental changes in NOx emissions from point and mobile sources, respectively (Muller and Mendelsohn 2006) . 34 We first use the model to estimate the benefits (in terms of avoided damages, measured in dollars) per pound of NOx emissions reduced for each of the 632 coal-fired electricity generating units in the NBP. Averaging across units, the average estimate per pound of NOx is $1.09 (with a standard deviation of $0.61). We then use the same approach to estimate the value of damages avoided per pound of NOx reduced at ground level sources for each of the counties affected by Tier 2. The unweighted average across all counties is $1.78/lb NOx.
Our estimated benefits from mobile source emissions reductions needs to be adjusted to more accurately reflect the location (in space and time) of emissions reductions achieved under Tier 2. The emissions reductions achieved under Tier 2 will occur disproportionately in counties where more driving occurs, so we weight the county-level damage estimates by county-specific measures of annual vehicle miles travelled. This increases our estimated average benefit to $1.81/lb NOx. We also need to account for the fact that NOx emitted during the ozone off-season will have little (if any) effect on ozone concentrations. An estimated 44 percent of vehicle miles are driven during ozone season. 35 We assume that only 44 percent of the emissions reductions achieved under Tier 2 deliver ozone-related benefits. Having made this adjustment, the estimated average benefit falls to $1.69 per pound of NOx. This estimate exceeds our estimated marginal benefit from reductions achieved at NBP sources by more than 50 percent.
In sum, the state of scientific evidence on how damages from NOx emissions compare across source types is on balance consistent with our simplifying assumption that these marginal damages per pound of NOx reduced do not differ significantly across source types. If anything, this assumption is conservative, as there is some evidence suggesting that damages are higher, on average, from passenger vehicles.
B. The marginal cost of abatement for vehicles is constant
Our assumption that the marginal cost of abatement for vehicles is constant beyond the levels regulated by Tier 2 is certainly crucial to our analysis. To assess the plausibility of this assumption, we consider the costs of steps that could have been taken to further reduce NOx emissions from vehicles, but were not at the time that the regulations were adopted. To frame the discussion, we note that equating marginal abatement costs across the two industries would have required an increase in abatement under Tier 2 of roughly 14 percent. 36 The available evidence indicates that NOx reductions under Tier 2 could have been increased by well over 14 percent without increasing marginal abatement costs. The EPA expected Tier 2 to be met through an increase in the size of the typical vehicle's catalytic converter, as well as through increases in the diffusion of a number of emissions reducing technologies. Imagine two simple scenarios. First, suppose that the EPA expected abatement to come exclusively from increasing the size of catalytic converters. If abatement is linear in the size of the catalytic converter and costs scale linearly with size, then marginal costs would be constant, at least locally. Next, suppose that the EPA expected that Tier 2 compliance would be achieved by accelerating the diffusion of some emissions reducing technology X from 25 percent of vehicles to 50 percent, and that the cost per vehicle of installing this technology was uniform across different types of vehicles. In this case, abatement using technology X could increase by as much as 200 percent before we would expect a discrete jump in marginal costs. In practice, the EPA expected a mixture of these two scalable compliance strategies.
Modern day catalytic converters are used to control carbon monoxide, hydrocarbon, and NOx emissions (so-called three-way converters). They work by using semi-precious metals that stimulate a chemical reaction using the metal and heat to convert the pollutant into oxygen (or nitrogen in the case of NOx). The more semi-precious the metal, the larger the chemical reaction, and the lower the emissions. Manufacturers achieve greater amounts of semi-precious metal by either increasing the volume of the catalytic converter or through better "loading", layering more of the metal within the same volume.
The EPA forecast that both volume and loading would increase under Tier 2, but by small amounts. In particular, they forecast that catalytic converter volume would increase such that the size of the catalytic converter matched the engine's displacement, representing an increase of roughly 15 percent across all engines analyzed, and loading would increase approximately 10 percent (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1999a). If the relationship between the amount of semi-precious metal in the catalytic converter and abatement is linear, then marginal costs of abatement will be constant. P. Marsh, F. Acke, R. Konieczny, R. Bruck and P. Hirth (2001) analyze how emissions change with increases in loading and find that the relationship is essentially linear when moving from 600 cells per square inch (cpsi) to 1,200 cpsi, holding volume fixed. 37 The EPA reports that the industry standard under Tier 1 was 400 cpsi, therefore the range analyzed in Marsh et al. is likely to cover the increase in emissions required to equate marginal costs.
Under Tier 2, reductions in NOx are also coming from other technologies and engine modifications. If the EPA projections exhausted these other technologies and engine modifications, then marginal costs may not be flat over the full range we require. 38 However, this does not appear to be the case. The EPA summarized their predictions regarding changes in other NOx reducing technologies and engine alterations in Tables  V-3 through V-7 of the Regulatory Impact Analysis. The EPA reports expected adoption rates of 22 technologies/engine alterations for 11 engine/vehicle combinations. For example, the EPA projected that, to meet Tier 2, the percentage of 4-cylinder light-duty vehicles using a universal exhaust gas oxygen sensor (UEGO) will increase from 0 percent to 15 percent. 39 Because the EPA treats each engine/vehicle combination as homogenous, they expect that increasing UEGOs from 15 to 30 percent would have the same impact on emissions as increasing their penetration from 0 to 15 percent. Therefore, provided these technologies are not fully adopted under Tier 2, we can extend the marginal cost curve beyond the Tier 2 levels.
For the light-duty car (LDV) and light-duty trucks 1 and 2 (LDT1 and LDT2), with the exception of "faster microprocessor", all of the listed technologies either have room for additional penetration, or were at 100 percent penetration prior to Tier 2. 40 Furthermore, the penetration rates are at most 75 percent and often 10 to 15 percent. This suggests that increasing abatement by an additional 14 percent using the same technologies as were used to comply with Tier 2 possible. The penetration rate for a number of technologies applied to the larger trucks (LDT3 and LDT4) are at 100 percent under Tier 2, although several technologies remain below full penetration. 41 We note, however, that this may be a by-product of the fact that Tier 2 also implemented a maximum emission rate which they expected to be binding for these vehicle classes. While we ignore the fact that this raises the marginal cost of Tier 2 in our calculations, we also note that further emission reductions from automobiles would likely come from the smaller of the light-duty vehicles.
C. Demand side responses are small and inconsequential
For both vehicles and power plants, we have assumed that the NOx reductions we consider would not affect consumer demand. In the power sector, the coal plants that incur the majority of the compliance costs are typically inframarginal due to their relatively low fuel operating costs. Price-setting units (typically natural gas or oil-fueled plants) represent a very small fraction of the NOx emissions regulated under the NBP and tend to have much lower uncontrolled NOx emissions rates. Whereas the average pre-retrofit NOx emissions rate among coal plants exceeded 5.5 lbs/MWh, average NOx emissions rates among marginal electricity producers are estimated to range between 0.3 to 2.2 lbs NOx/MWh (NEISO 2006, G. Keith, D. White, B. Biewald and S.E. Economics 2003) . Consequently, even if marginal producers pass through their variable NBP compliance costs in full, the resulting increase in consumer electricity prices will reflect only a small fraction of the compliance costs incurred by coal-fired generators.
Some simple calculations help to illustrate the likely demand-side impacts of the NOx Buget Program. A permit price of $1.00/lb NOx would reduce the variable operating costs of marginal producers by approximately $0.30-$2.20 per MWh. If these costs were passed directly through to customers, this would amount to a retail electricity price increase of between 0.03 -2.5 percent. Given the the inelasticity of electricity demand, a price change of this magnitude would have negligible impacts on demand. We thus make the simplifying assumption that consumers would not adjust their electricity consumption in response to the regulatory change we consider.
Similarly, the costs of complying with Tier 2 (reflected in Table 2 ) are very small relative to the cost of a new vehicle. It is standard to assume that the price-elasticity of demand for new cars is below 1 (P.S. McCarthy 1996) . The price changes caused by Tier 2 are less than 0.2 percent of the average retail price for vehicles in 2004. 42 We therefore ignore the demand side in our analysis because any demand-side impacts are likely to be small.
VI. Other NOx Programs
The bulk of our analysis focuses on comparing the costs of reducing NOx from passenger vehicles to the costs of reducing NOx from power plants. As depicted in Figure 1 , these two sources account for less than half of the man-made NOx in the U.S.: passenger, or light-duty, vehicles emitted 18 percent of U.S. NOx in 2002, just before the Tier 2 standards came into effect, and electric utilities emitted 23 percent. The remaining emissions come from non-highway mobile sources, such as farm and construction equipment (20 percent), heavy-duty highway vehicles (19 percent) and industrial processes and sources (19 percent). Trends in emissions from these five categories suggest different time paths of emissions reductions. As shown in Figure 4 , there have been dramatic improvements in the emissions of NOx from light-duty vehicles, while the emissions from the other sources have remained more constant.
Recently, both heavy-duty highway and non-highway mobile sources have been subject to more stringent regulations, and the regulatory impact analyses provide engineering estimates of the relative costs of reducing NOx from these sources. There have been two sets of regulations aimed at heavy-duty highway vehicles. Regulations promulgated in 1997 and effective in 2004 required a number of minor changes to heavy-duty diesel and gasoline trucks, such as injection timing retard. These changes were estimated to be extremely cost effective at a range of roughly $100-$300 per ton ($0.05-$0.15 per pound) including markups. The next set of regulations, enacted in 2000 to be effective in 2007, required new technology, such as "clean gas induction," 43 selective catalytic reduction, and the development of new catalysts, and entailed costs per pound that were approximately an order of magnitude higher than the first set of regulations. These cost estimates are also very close to the cost estimates for vehicles under Tier 2. Engineers with whom we have spoken contend that achieving reductions beyond what was required by the 2007 regulations would have involved implementing new and as yet untested technologies and could involve much higher costs. In light of this, and in light of the difference between the 2004 and 2007 regulations, it seems likely that the marginal cost of abatement is steeply sloped for trucks. Hence, equalizing marginal abatement costs between trucks and power plants would not obviously lead to efficiency gains as large as the ones we describe for passenger vehicles.
Non-road diesel vehicles and engines, such as bulldozers and auxillary generators, are another story, as NOx standards for this class have historically been extremely lax. In 1998, standards were adopted that reduced NOx and particulate matter by as much as two-thirds for some engines. The EPA calculated the cost of achieving these reductions for a wide array of engine sizes, ranging from 25 horsepower to over 1,000 horsepower. For many of these engines, the legislation simply required using technologies already in use for on-road vehicles. Using assumptions similar to those for the Tier 2 analysis (their assumed markup is 29 percent), the EPA calculated the average cost of abatement for six engines sizes. The average cost of abatement varies across the engine size, but for the largest size (also the largest polluters), the costs ranged from $10-110 per ton ($0.005-$0.055 per pound); the average abatement cost for the smaller sizes are typically below $600 per ton ($0.30 per pound).
There are two reasons to believe these are actually upper bounds. For one, these calculations do not account for the reduction in particulate matter, which were considerable. Second, many of the compliance strategies improve the operating efficiency of the engines. Factoring in the reduced operating costs suggest negative average abatement costs for many engines. While one can view the negative abatement costs with some skepticism, the improved efficiency certainly reduces the social abatement costs.
VII. Conclusions and Discussion
Large scale, market-based air pollution regulations such as the Acid Rain Program and the NOx Budget Program have successfully taken advantage of significant gains from trade among large industrial sources of pollution. Here, we present evidence to suggest that there is also potential for efficiency improvements from coordinating abatement activity across mobile and point sources. Cost-effective coordination of two landmark regulations that aim to reduce NOx emissions, the NOx Budget Program and Federal Tier 2 passenger vehicle standards, would significantly reduce the abatement costs borne by the electricity sector (by 78 percent) and increase the abatement costs born by the automotive sector (by 15 percent). Taken together, we estimate that the total costs of achieving the NOx emissions reductions mandated by these two programs could be reduced by six percent (or $1.6 billion) through more efficient regulatory coordination.
There are a number of reasons to believe our estimates represent a lower bound of the productive inefficiencies present in regulating NOx. First, there is strong evidence to suggest that other mobile sources, such as non-road diesel, have lower marginal abatement costs than passenger vehicles. Second, while we have noted that the desulfurization program imposed on refiners was an inefficient way to reduce NOx (even after crediting for the reduced sulfur from the program), we do not estimate the gains from scaling it back. Finally, we note that our results are based on comparing a market-based program for power plants to a command-and-control standard for motor vehicles. This makes our estimates of the marginal cost of abating NOx emissions from vehicles an upper bound on the true marginal cost if a more market-based approach were adopted. For instance, if regulators were able to pass a "NOx tax" for vehicles, the market might uncover a number of less expensive abatement strategies, such as driving less or retiring old vehicles. Of course, implementing the NOx tax would require new monitoring technologies, such as sensors that differed by vehicle make and model and could adjust the tax appropriately at the pump.
Our findings are particularly relevant to the ongoing debate over how to design policies to address climate change. There is tremendous pressure on regulators to find ways to keep the economic costs of achieving proposed greenhouse gas reduction targets to a minimum. In theory, an economy wide tax or cap-and-trade program should ensure that marginal abatement costs are equated across all sources. Some have argued that the transportation sector, which accounts for 27 percent of total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, should be regulated separately from large point sources (A.E. Farrell and D. Sperling 2007) . Of the climate change policy proposals currently under consideration, some would have point and mobile sources of greenhouse gas emissions regulated under the same market-based regulatory program, whereas others adopt sector-specific regulation. This paper illustrates the potential for inefficiency when sectors and source types are regulated separately. 45 $1.6 billion *Assumes $10,000/ton for PM (a total credit of $3.5 billion) and $4,800/ton for Sulfur (a total credit of $13.8 billion) 
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